Top Tens in 2014:  Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade-Secret Cases by McJohn, Stephen
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Volume 13 | Issue 3 Article 3
2015




This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation




Top Tens in 2014:  Patent, Trademark,  
Copyright and Trade-Secret Cases 
Stephen McJohn 
 
2015 VOL. 13, NO. 3 
 
© 2015 by Northwestern University School of Law 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
     N O R T H W E S T E R N  
J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  
A N D  
I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
Copyright 2015 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 13, Number 3 (2015) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
 
 317 
Top Tens in 2014:  Patent, Trademark,  
Copyright and Trade-Secret Cases 
By Stephen McJohn* 
ABSTRACT 
 The Supreme Court decided more patent cases in 2014 than any previous year. It 
lowered the standard for awarding fees in patent cases, clarified that the patent holder 
carries the burden of showing infringement even in declaratory judgment actions, lowered 
the standard for invalidating patent claims as vague, and rejected the theory that 
infringement may occur by simply adding the actions of separate parties. The most 
important case, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, announced a test for patentable 
subject matter, especially for software and business method inventions, that was 
considerably more restrictive than case law to date. 
 Meanwhile, the most notable case in copyright seemed to go in the opposite direction, 
raising the level of copyright protection for software, perhaps even creating a split in the 
circuits. In Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the application 
programming interfaces of the Java programming language were copyrightable 
expression, as opposed to non-copyrightable functional matter. The Supreme Court held 
that rebroadcast of television programs infringed the public performance right, even where 
done using technology that effectively gave each viewer a personal antenna. The Court 
also rejected the application of laches in copyright cases, permitting litigation of long-
standing infringement. 
 Other cases provided important precedent on evergreen issues in intellectual 
property law. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton reversed a safe harbor approach to the 
application of fair use to university coursebooks. Garcia v. Google, Inc. raised the 
possibility that anyone who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, may have 
their own separate copyright. Trademark cases addressed such questions as who may bring 
a false advertising case, when matter is functional, when trademarks become generic or 
are otherwise abandoned, when others may use a mark to describe things, and when a 
mark may be cancelled as disparaging of a group of people. In trade secret, the Third 
Circuit avoided the surprisingly important issue of liability for account slurping. Other 
cases dealt with the interfaces between trade secret and contract and between trade secret 
and patent. Courts also dealt with the balance between disclosing information to potential 
partners and maintaining sufficient security measures to qualify for trade secret protection.  
 
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Lorie Graham, Ian McJohn, Heidi 
Harvey,  Joseph Koipally, and my Suffolk IP colleagues, Andy Beckerman-Rodau, Chris Gibson, Leah 
Chan Grinvald, Rebecca Curtin, Mike Rustad, and Jessica Silbey. 
 Comments welcome: smcjohn@suffolk.edu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Supreme Court decided more patent-related cases in 2014 than in any previous 
year.1 It lowered the standard for awarding fees in patent cases,2 clarified that the patent 
holder carries the burden of showing infringement even in declaratory judgment actions,3 
lowered the standard for invalidating patent claims as vague,4 and rejected the theory that 
infringement may occur by simply adding the actions of separate parties.5 The most 
important case, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,6 announced a test for patentable 
subject matter, especially for software and business method inventions, that was 
considerably more restrictive than case law to date.  
¶2 Meanwhile, the most notable case in copyright seemed to go in the opposite direction, 
raising the level of copyright protection for software, perhaps even prompting a potential 
circuit split. In Oracle Inc. v. Google Inc.,7 the Federal Circuit held that the application 
programming interfaces of the Java programming language were copyrightable expression, 
as opposed to non-copyrightable functional matter. Further, the Supreme Court held that 
rebroadcast of television programs infringed the public performance right, even when using 
technology that effectively gave each viewer a personal antenna.8 The Court also rejected 
the application of laches in copyright cases, permitting litigation of long-standing 
infringement.9  
¶3 Other cases provided important precedent on evergreen issues in intellectual property 
law. Cambridge University Press v. Patton10 reversed a safe harbor approach to the 
application of fair use to university course books. Garcia v. Google, Inc.11 raised the 
possibility that anyone who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, may have her 
own separate copyright. Trademark cases addressed such questions as who may bring a 
false advertising case, when matter is functional, when trademarks become generic or are 
otherwise abandoned, when others may use a mark to describe things, and when a mark 
may be cancelled as disparaging of a group of people. In trade secret, the Third Circuit 
avoided the surprisingly important issue of liability for account slurping.12 Other cases 
dealt with the interfaces between trade secret and contract law13 and between trade secret 
and patent law.14 Courts also addressed the balance between disclosing information to 
1 At least, going back to 1952. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html. 
2 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
3 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
4 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
5 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
6 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
7 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
8 ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc , 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
9 Petrella v. MGM, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
10 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair Use Cases of 2014, TECH. & 
MKTG. LAW BLOG, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guest-
blog-post.htm. 
11 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted en banc, 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir.). 
12 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014). 
13 See Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer 742 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2014).  
14 See Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014). 
Vol. 13:3] Stephen McJohn 
 321 
potential partners and maintaining sufficient security measures to qualify for trade-secret 
protection.15 
I. PATENT 
A. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International16 
17 
¶4  Alice will likely finally set the test for patentable subject matter. Patentable subject 
matter does not include abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena.18 After 
leaving those exclusions undefined for decades, the Court decided three cases in recent 
years that help define the contours of patentable subject matter. The Court held: (1) in 
Bilski v. Kappos,19 that a method for hedging risk was an unpatentable abstract idea; (2) in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc.,20 that a diagnostic method that 
simply adjusted dosages of a drug based on blood-test results was an unpatentable claim to 
a natural law; and (3) in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,21 
that human DNA is an unpatentable natural phenomenon. Those cases clarified the certain 
aspects previously unsettled case law, but left important questions open, such as whether 
courts should analyze the three exceptions similarly and how they applied to software 
patents. In 2014, the Court addressed those questions in Alice, which dealt with the 
patentability of “a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’–i.e., the 
 
15 See Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 53, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
714, 735-36 (2014). 
16 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
17 The illustrations in this article from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking 
Glass are by John Tenniel. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1st prtg. 1865); 
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (1st prtg. 1871), available at http://www.alice-in-
wonderland.net/alice2a.html. 
18 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
19 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
20 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
21 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation” by 
using a third-party intermediary.”22 
¶5  Alice held that the underlying policy for all three exclusions was the risk that a patent 
would pre-empt a basic tool of scientific and technological work.23 Monopolization of such 
tools would impede rather than promote innovation, and thus inhibit further discovery.24 
The Alice Court also recognized that “[a]t the same time, we tread carefully in construing 
this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, ‘all 
inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas.’”25 An invention is not rendered ineligible for a patent simply because it 
involves an abstract concept. Further, as the Court put it, “[a]pplication[s]” of such 
concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’ we have said, remain eligible for patent protection.”26 
To balance these concerns, the Court held that a single test, drawn from Mayo, was the 
framework for analyzing patentable subject matter under all three exceptions: 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those 
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the 
claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of 
each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine 
whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a 
patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a 
search for an “inventive concept”—i.e., an element or combination of 
elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”27  
¶6  Applying the first part of the test, the Court held that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski, 
the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent 
in our system of commerce.’” 28 In this respect, the Court broadened patentable subject 
matter to encompass considerations of novelty and nonobviousness.29 Whether something 
is an abstract idea could now depend not just on the idea, but whether it is well-known. 
¶7  Turning to the second step, the Alice court held that “the claims at issue are drawn to 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer 
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”30 
Although the Court never used the word “software,” this analysis has broad implications 
for software patents. Importantly, simply incorporating a computer in the invention will 
 
22 134 S. Ct. at 2352. 
23 Id. at 2354. 
24 Id. at 2354 (citing Bilksi, Mayo, and Myriad). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
27 Id. at 2355 (citation omitted). 
28 Id. at 2356 (citation omitted). 
29 On the topic of nonobviousness: Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. was 
seen by some as making it easier to find pharmaceutical inventions obvious, by raising the higher standard 
for unexpected results that indicate a chemical compound is nonobvious. 752 F. 3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
See Gitrada Harmon, Obviousness Analysis For New Chemical Compounds (2014), draft on file with 
author. 
30 134 S. Ct. at 2347. 
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not make an idea patentable. However, the Court did give some guidance as to what would 
make computer-related inventions patentable: “The method claims do not, for example, 
purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an 
improvement in any other technology or technical field.”31 
¶8  After Alice, the framework for addressing patentable subject matter is the two-step 
test from Mayo. The content of those steps, however, remains uncertain. For example, the 
Court did not attempt to define “abstract idea.”32 Perhaps, this is because, at some level, 
every invention must rest on one or more abstract ideas. The second step likewise is 
flexible. It suggests that a method may be patentable if it improves the functioning of a 
computer or affects an improvement in some technical field.33 A broad reading would be 
that any improvement in software improves how a computer works. A narrower reading 
would provide patent eligibility only for software intended to make the computer itself 
work better, as opposed to software that accomplishes an established task in a different 
manner (e.g., faster, more reliably, more securely, etc.). Yet no bright-line distinction exists 
between the two. Likewise, “technical field” is not a clear boundary. But the underlying 
policy – avoiding the preemption of building-block technologies – may provide sufficient 
guidance. For instance, in copyright law, a similar test – the elusive distinction between 
non-copyrightable ideas and copyrightable expression – serving merely to clarify any 
policy issues, has worked well for decades.34  
¶9  The Federal Circuit soon implemented the approach newly defined in Alice, holding 
that delivering advertising with online video content to be outside patentable subject 
matter, which the Federal Circuit had twice previously held to be within patentable subject 
matter.35 Thus, the Federal Circuit has assuredly taken a new direction in the wake of Alice. 
But before the year was out, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a software process for 
maintaining the look and feel of a website, meaning perhaps that sufficiently specific 
software patents will survive the Alice test.36 In addition, as technology heads toward the 
Internet of Things, 37where online software will likely control many physical devices, 
various software inventions may be concrete enough to pass Alice. 
B. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.38 
¶10  Nautilus concerned a patent on a heart monitor. Specifically, some argued that the 
claim language indicating electrodes with a “spaced relationship” with one another was too 
vague, thus rendering the patent invalid. 
 
31 Id. at 2359 (citation omitted). 
32 Id. at 2350. 
33 Id. 
34 See Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343 (2009). 
35 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
36 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.2014). 
37 “In what’s called the Internet of Things, sensors and actuators embedded in physical objects—from 
roadways to pacemakers—are linked through wired and wireless networks, often using the same Internet 
Protocol (IP) that connects the Internet.” Michael Chui, et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q., March 
2010, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_things. 
38 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
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¶11  Commentators have criticized patent claims, especially in software patents, as too 
vague to provide proper notice of the scope of the claimed invention.39 An inventor must 
submit claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as [the] invention.”40 The Federal Circuit’s test on the issue was 
relatively patentee-friendly, holding that a claim was only invalid for vagueness if it was 
“insolubly ambiguous.”41 If the court could reach any clear interpretation of the claim, it 
survived. As in Alice, the Supreme Court in Nautilus sought to balance competing policies: 
“The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that 
absolute precision is unattainable.”42 
¶12  The Court formulated a test to reconcile those interests: “Cognizant of the competing 
concerns, we read § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the 
specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention with reasonable certainty.”43  
¶13  Patent claim interpretation is notoriously difficult, because patents rely on technical 
language and are drafted with many goals in mind, including obfuscation.44 Every patent 
claim should be unique, because it should claim a unique invention.45 To determine 
whether a word or phrase can be understood with “reasonable certainty” in a sui generis 
document may often be elusive. 
C. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC46 
¶14  Clear patent claims are difficult to draft, as Nautilus reflects. The Patent Act offers 
various tools to deal with that, including means-plus-function claims.47 Section 112 allows 
an inventor, rather than listing every element of structure in the invention, to simply 
describe an element as a means to accomplish a task.48 The court then interprets the patent 
claim to cover the means that the inventor discloses in the description of the invention.49 
That makes claim drafting easier but limits the breadth of the patent claim to the means 
described. A product very similar to the inventor’s product, but which uses a different 
means for that one element, will not infringe. So applicants often avoid means-plus-
function claims to avoid narrower protection.50 The Federal Circuit has reached 
 
39 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009). 
40 134 S. Ct. at 2124 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006)) (alteration in original). 
41 Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
42 Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129. 
43 Id. 
44 Stephen McJohn, Patents: Hiding From History, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
961 (2008). 
45 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (providing that an invention is patentable only if new and not anticipated 
by prior inventions). 
46 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
47 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step 
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. (“[S]uch claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described 
in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). 
50 See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
905, 918 (“The result is that means-plus-function claiming today is viewed as narrow and easy for potential 
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inconsistent conclusions as to whether expert testimony is necessary to show a lack of 
structure in the means-plus-function analysis.51 The Federal Circuit has also held that the 
necessary structure, for a computer-related invention such as smartphone technology, may 
be found looking to a broad array of sources in the specification, such as “an outline of an 
algorithm, a flowchart, or a specific set of instructions or rules.”52 
¶15  Whether a claim is in means-plus-function form53 depends on how the claim is 
interpreted. The issue can determine an infringement case. In Williamson, the issue was 
whether the word “module” referred to structure or whether “module” referred to a means 
for accomplishing a function, meaning the claim would read only on products that 
contained the same means described in the patent.54 The majority held that “module” did 
connote hardware or software structure, and was not merely a “nonce” word that needed 
specific definition of structure from the written description of the invention.55 
¶16  As the case reflects, a split has developed within the Federal Circuit on the proper 
approach to determine if a claim is a means-plus-function claim.56 The issue has particular 
import for software patents, which often include elements in functional form.57 Whether 
that element is treated as means-plus-function can determine the breadth and validity of the 
claim. 
D. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.58 
¶17  Patent claims are often quite complex. In order to infringe a claim, all elements of 
the claim must be met. In some cases, different parties perform different steps of a patented 
process. For instance, Akamai’s patent covered a method of delivering electronic data over 
a content delivery network, including the step of tagging the data.59 Limelight allegedly 
performed most of the steps, but had its customers tag the data. The question in Akamai 
was whether that constituted infringement, if all steps were performed but not all steps 
performed by the same person.60 Specifically, secondary liability requires that there be 
 
infringers to evade. Patent lawyers tend to avoid means-plus-function claim language, except as an “extra” 
put in a separate claim to hedge risk.”). 
51 Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
52 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
53 That is, it is limited to the particular means described in the application. 
54 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Appellees argue that the 
‘distributed learning control module’ limitation is drafted in the same format as a traditional means-plus-
function limitation, and merely replaces the term ‘means’ with the ‘nonce’ word ‘module,’ thereby 
connoting a generic ‘black box’ for performing the recited computer-implemented functions. In Appellees' 
view, since the term should be treated as a means-plus-function claim term and there is no algorithmic 
structure for implementing the claimed functions in the written description, the finding of indefiniteness 
should be affirmed.”). 
55 Id. at 1379-80. 
56 See Jason Rantanen, Williamson v. Citrix: Means-Plus-Function, Presumptions, and “Nonce” 
Words, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 3, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/12/williamson-function-
presumptions.html. A similar and unsettled issue with mechanical inventions is whether the phrase 
“adapted to” refers to structure capable of or specifically intended to serve the relevant purpose. 
57 See Lemley, supra note 50. 
58 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
59 Id. at 2115. 
60 Id. at 2117. 
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infringement.61 Could there be induced infringement if no single actor infringed? The 
Federal Circuit had held that there could be induced infringement, on the theory that the 
party caused others to perform steps for infringement.62 The Supreme Court rejected this 
theory, reasoning that there could not be secondary infringement without a direct 
infringer. 63 In short, The Supreme Court rejected that theory of “divided infringement.”64  
¶18  Notably, the Federal Circuit could still reach essentially the same result if it rejects 
its earlier holding in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.65 The Supreme Court in Akamai 
noted that the Federal Circuit had taken a very narrow view on joint infringement, in 
contrast to its broad view of divided infringement.66 In Muniauction, the Federal Circuit 
had limited the application of joint infringement to where the two parties acted in a 
principle agency relationship or have contractual obligations.67 If courts viewed joint 
infringement more pragmatically, such as where a software company directs a customer to 
perform certain steps, then joint infringement would apply to cases facts like Akamai. The 
Federal Circuit may revisit Muniauction in light of Akamai. This has considerable practical 
implications for licensing agreements. In litigation practice, parties may rely more on 
clauses and licensing to show joint infringement, and, in transactional practice, parties may 




63 Id. at 2117-18. 
64 The briefs in Akamai raised a remarkable argument, suggesting that the Federal Circuit approach 
would encourage parties to draft patent claims in the passive voice, allowing for an infringement if anyone 
anywhere, in aggregate, performed the steps of a patented process. E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 21, 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014) (No. 12-786), available at 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12-
786_pet_reply.authcheckdam.pdf. Such a claim drafting technique was termed the “aggressive passive 
voice” by participants at the Fourth IP Scholars’ Roundtable: Intellectual Property on the Ground, 
University of New Hampshire School of Law, November 21-22, 2014. 
65 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.2008). 
66 134 S. Ct. at 2119. 
67 Id. 
68 See Jean-Paul Ciardullo & Cynthia J. Rigsby, After the Supreme Court's Limelight Decision, 
Attention May Shift to Contract Analysis in Patent Cases, IP LITIG. CURRENT (July 2, 2014) 
http://www.iplitigationcurrent.com/2014/07/02/limelight-shift-attention-contract-analysis/. 
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E. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.69 & Highmark Inc. v. Allcare 
Health Management Systems70  
 
¶19  Octane Fitness made it easier for district courts to award attorney’s fees to successful 
parties in patent litigation.71 The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for the 
award of attorney’s fees under the patent statute.72 The Federal Circuit defined an 
“exceptional case” as one which either involves “material inappropriate conduct” or is both 
“objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.”73 The Court characterized the 
Federal Circuit’s test as rigid and unnecessarily narrow.74 Rather, the Court held, “an 
‘exceptional' case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive 
strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of 
the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” 75 The Court 
considered the totality of the circumstances, permitting a much broader approach than the 
Federal Circuit had permitted.76 
¶20  A companion case, Highmark, also made it more likely that a trial court’s award of 
attorney’s fees would survive.77 The Supreme Court overturned Federal Circuit precedent 
reviewing such decisions de novo, holding instead that a district court decision to award 
attorney’s fees is subject to review only as to whether it was an abuse of discretion.78 
¶21  These two cases changed the dynamics of patent enforcement. On the one hand, it is 
now riskier to seek enforcement of a questionable patent. On the other, it is now riskier to 
resist enforcement of a valid patent. Confident parties choosing to resist dubious patent 
claims now find themselves in a better position.  
F. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC79 
¶22  Several years back, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.80 lowered the standard for 
bringing declaratory judgment actions in patent cases by making it easier to challenge 
patents. The case left several questions open, including who would have the burden of 
proof.81 If a patent holder sues for infringement, the patent holder has the burden of 
 
69 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
70 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
71 134 S. Ct. at 1758. (“[N]othing in [35 U.S.C.] § 285 justifies such a high standard of proof. Section 
285 demands a simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a 
high one.”). 
72 Id. at 1756 (“This formulation superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is 
inherently flexible.”). 
73 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
74 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
78 Id. at 1749 (“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard 
in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination.”). 
79 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014). 
80 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
81 As the Medtronic court put it, the open question was: “A patent licensee paying royalties into an 
escrow account under a patent licensing agreement seeks a declaratory judgment that some of its products 
are not covered by or do not infringe the patent, and that it therefore does not owe royalties for those 
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showing infringement. If, instead, an alleged infringer sues, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that it is not infringing, does it bear the burden of showing noninfringement? Medtronic 
held that the burden of showing infringement rests on the patent holder.82 Any other rule 
would create a possible inconsistency in determinations, as well as a possible chill against 
parties subjected to likely invalid intellectual property rights. 83 The Court reasoned that 
the licensee may have initiated the suit, but the patent holder “is in a better position than 
an alleged infringer to know, and to be able to point out, just where, how, and why a product 
(or process) infringes a claim of that patent.” 84 Medtronic removes a significant obstacle 
to challenging patents. If the burden of proof of noninfringement were on the party bringing 
a declaratory judgment action, that would make parties less likely to file suit to challenge 
patents.  
G. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.85 
¶23  Apple Inc. v. Motorola, among other things, makes it more difficult for a party 
holding the patent on industry standards to prevent others from using those standards, even 
where no license agreement is in effect.86 A party with such a standard essential patent may 
have agreed in general to license it to others in the industry under reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms.87 There may be considerable disagreement however about what 
terms are reasonable. Until other parties have obtained such a license, the patent holder 
might seek an injunction to prevent them using the relevant technology. Motorola, 
however, held that an injunction may not necessarily be awarded in such a case88. One 
factor for injunctive relief is whether a sufficient remedy is available through damages.89 
The court held that damages may be sufficient, making an injunction unavailable, because 
the right to pay royalties and use the technology has been established by agreement.90  
¶24  The holding may cut two ways with respect to standard-setting patents. Where a party 
has agreed to contribute a standard-setting patent, others may use the standard knowing 
that they will be likely subject only to damages for a reasonable royalty, as opposed to an 
injunction against use. That may speed licensing transactions. But the holding may delay 
the initial contribution, because a party with a potential standard patent will know that once 
it agrees to contribute the patent, it will no longer have control over whether others use the 
technology. 
 
products. In that suit, who bears the burden of proof, or, to be more precise, the burden of persuasion? Must 
the patentee prove infringement or must the licensee prove noninfringement?” 134 S. Ct. at 849.. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 850. 
84 Id. 
85 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
86 Id. (affirming denial of injunction to party holding industry standard patents). 
87 Id. at 1323-24 (discussing Motorola’s licensing of its standard-essential patent portfolio subject to 
obligation to license at fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms). 
88 Id. at 1331-32. 
89 Id. at 1332. 
90 Id. (“ Motorola's FRAND commitments, which have yielded many license agreements encompassing 
the '898 patent, strongly suggest that money damages are adequate to fully compensate Motorola for any 
infringement.”). 
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H. Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co.91 
¶25  Qimonda AG, a German semiconductor manufacturer, had patent cross licenses with 
many of its competitors.92 In industries like electronics, such licenses allow parties to have 
a truce with respect to patents. Qimonda filed bankruptcy and ceased operations, so no 
longer needed the protection of the cross licenses. 93 Rather, it terminated the licenses under 
German bankruptcy law, to renegotiate licenses under which it would instead receive 
royalty payments.94 
¶26  Qimonda filed a chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States, to do the 
same with its American licenses.95 The representative “committed to re-license Qimonda's 
patent portfolio to the Licensees at a reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("RAND") 
royalty.” 96 Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the representative of a foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding to file an ancillary proceeding in the United States.97 It also allows 
broad recognition of orders entered in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding.98 But the 
recognition is subject to certain safeguards. The US bankruptcy court may refuse to apply 
the foreign order if “the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
United States."99 In addition, the court must ensure that "the interests of the creditors and 
other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected."100 
¶27  US bankruptcy law provides special protection for intellectual property licensees.101 
Even where a bankrupt licensor rejects the license in bankruptcy, the licensee may continue 
to use the rights, provided it performs its obligations under the license.102 German 
bankruptcy law, by contrast, allows a licensor to simply terminate a license.103 Jaffé 
addressed a question with little precedent, given that Chapter 15 is relatively new: how 
extensive are the limits to recognizing foreign rules within US bankruptcy proceedings? In 
particular, is the applicable standard relatively high, rejecting only foreign orders that are 
“manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States,”104 or also broadly 
protective, requiring general protection of all interested parties105? Jaffé blended the 
standards somewhat. It upheld refusal to terminate the licenses, because termination would 
adversely affect the licensees (by denying them the protection normally afforded under US 
law), which in turn would affect public policy, because harm to the licensees might “slow 
the pace of innovation in the United States, to the detriment of the U.S. economy.”106  
 
91 Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013). 




96 Id. at 21. 
97 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012). 
98 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520-1521 (2012). 
99 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012). 
100 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2012). 
101 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012). 
102 Id. 
103 Jaffé, 737 F.3d at 17 (discussing § 103 of the German Insolvency Code). 
104 11 U.S.C. § 1506. 
105 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a). 
106 Jaffé, 737 F.3d at 32. 
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I. Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.107 & DSM Desotech Inc. v. 
3D Systems Corp.108 
 
¶28  Antitrust liability will normally not lie for filing a patent infringement suit against a 
competitor, under the doctrine of "Noerr-Pennington immunity."109 But that immunity will 
not be obtained if the litigation is a sham, brought baselessly simply to harm competition.110 
Tyco addressed two issues with respect to that interplay between the exclusionary power 
of a patent and anti-trust law’s limits on exclusionary conduct that harms competition.111 
First, the court held that liability for fraudulent procurement of patents could apply where 
a party does not fraudulently obtain patents, but acquired them with and has the requisite 
knowledge, but that the necessary knowledge was not shown in that case.112 It also held 
that litigation to enforce of the patents was not baseless as matter of law, because the patent 
owner proposed a factually plausible theory of infringement.113 
¶29  But, beyond patent litigation, the patent owner had also filed a petition with the Food 
and Drug Administration to prevent the generic maker from marketing its version of the 
drug. 114 The patent owner argued that the sham exception to immunity was limited to 
litigation in court. 115 Only a patent law suit that was manifestly contrary to governing 
 
107 Tyco Healthcare Group v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
108 DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 749 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
109 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
110 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
111 762 F.3d at 1349. 
112 Id. at 1349-50.  
113 Id. at 1344-45.  
114 Id. at 1341.  
115 Id. at 1347.  
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science would be subject to the exception as baseless.116 The appellate court held, however, 
that the sham exception could also apply in administrative proceedings.117 
¶30  DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems is significant for antitrust law on developing 
technologies.118 Desotech alleged that 3D Systems tried to monopolize the market for 
replacement resin cartridges for the 3D printer by using technological locks to prevent the 
use of the cartridges of its competitors.119 The court held that Desotech did not show a 
distinct market for stereolithography 3D printers and their resin (of which 3D Systems sold 
the majority), where other technologies might serve as substitutes.120 
J. In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh)121 
 
¶31  Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. held that human DNA 
was not patentable.122 Even if the inventor had succeeded in isolating and purifying the 
DNA, it was still a product of nature not within patentable subject matter.123 But the Court 
held that cDNA, a molecule made by taking only the portions of human DNA that code for 
a gene, was patentable, because it was not a natural phenomenon.124 After Myriad, an 
important question remains: how different must an invention be from a naturally occurring 
phenomenon to qualify for patent protection? The issue has great practical importance, 




118 DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 749 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing 
development of "rapid-prototyping technology"). 
119 Id. at 1339. 
120 Id. at 1344-45, 1347. 
121 In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
122 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
123 Id. at 2111. 
124 Id. at 2119. 
125 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding genetically engineered bacterium 
was within patentable subject matter). 
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¶32  In re Roslin Institute addressed the issue, as applied to a famous sheep.126 It held 
patents related to the famous cloned sheep Dolly to be invalid, for failure to claim sufficient 
differences between the sheep providing the source of the cloned cells and the resulting 
cloned animal.127 The patentee pointed to differences between a clone and a natural version 
of an organism but failed to show that the patent claims included those characteristics.128 
II. TRADEMARK 
A. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.129 
¶33  The federal trademark statute provides a cause of action much broader than 
trademark infringement: false advertising.130 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes 
liability on anyone who “in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 
services, or commercial activities.”131 Not everyone aggrieved by false advertising, 
however, can sue under this provision. Lexmark sold printers and toner cartridges.132 
Lexmark equipped its cartridges with microchips used for verification, to encourage 
customers only to use Lexmark cartridges.133  Static Control sold microchips which allow 
competitors of Lexmark to refurbish and resell Lexmark cartridges.134 Static Control 
alleged that Lexmark issued false advertising to the effect it was illegal to use static controls 
microchips.135 Reasoning that the provision was intended to protect against unfair 
competition, most courts had limited standing to competitors.136 Under this approach, 
Static Control would lack standing to sue Lexmark for false advertising. 
¶34  The Supreme Court took a slightly broader view. The statute allows a suit by “any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”137 The court 
did not read the language would allow anyone to sue for false advertising.138 Rather, the 
Court limited standing to those with interests “within the zone of interests protected by the 
law invoked.”139 For false advertising, that would be required that “a plaintiff must allege 
an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales” and “economic or reputational 
injury flowing directly from the deception.”140 That would not include consumers or 
business misled by false advertising into buying goods or services, or parties indirectly 
harmed by false advertising, such as suppliers of a company whose sales plummeted due 
 
126 750 F.3d at 1334. 
127 Id. at 1337. 
128 Id. at 1337-38. 
129 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
130 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
131 Id. 
132 134 S. Ct. at 1383. 
133 Id. at 1383. 
134 Id. at 1384. 
135 Id. at 1383. 
136 Id. at 1384-85. 
137 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
138 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391. 
139 Id. at 1388 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
140 Id. at 1390-91. 
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to falsities.141 But it did include Static Control. Lexmark’s false advertising allegedly stated 
that Static’s Control’s products were illegal, harming Static Control’s sales.142  
B. Ferring Pharmaceuticals v. Watson Pharmaceuticals143 
 
¶35  The Supreme Court in eBay144 altered the general approach of automatically granting 
injunctions once infringement was shown in patent cases. There are some arguments that 
injunctions should be more readily granted in trademark actions.145 Patent cases often 
involve large damage, but trademark actions less so.146 Trademark infringement requires 
showing the use of a symbol that is likely to cause confusion or deception.147 Injury to 
reputation may not be as readily remedied with monetary damages.148 Similarly, some 
courts have applied a presumption of automatic harm in false advertising cases, on the 
theory that a “misleading comparison to a specific competing product necessarily 
diminishes that product's value in the minds of the consumer.”149 
¶36  Ferring Pharmaceuticals rejected that presumption. The court noted that some courts 
have extended the eBay analysis to copyright cases150. It reasoned that eBay was based not 
on the special characteristics of patents, but rather on general principles of equity that 
govern when the powerful remedy of an injunction should be imposed. 151 Before ordering 
a defendant to shut down a line of business, a court should normally require actual, not 
merely presumed, harm.152 If harm is indeed so likely to occur in a false advertising case, 
then it should be easy for the plaintiff to show harm resulted. In Ferring Pharmaceuticals, 
 
141 Id. at 1391. 
142 Id. at 1393-94. 
143 Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2014). 
144 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
145 David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99 
TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1055 (2009). 
146 Id. 
147 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). 
148 Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 145. 
149 Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
150 Id. at 213-214. 
151 Id. at 215-216. 
152 Id. 
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the court further held, there was not a sufficient showing of irreparable harm.153 Watson 
allegedly broadcast false statements about a pharmaceutical in a webcast to medical 
professionals. 154 The statements were no longer available and there was no evidence that 
they would actually affect whether doctors prescribed and patients used the 
pharmaceutical.155 
C. Elliot v. Google Inc.156  
 
Escalator patent     Thermos by another name 
¶37  Aspirin, Cellophane, Dry ice, Escalator, Laundromat, Mimeograph, Pilates, 
Thermos, Trampoline and Zipper all began as brand names and ended as generic names for 
a product. In some cases, the product was patented, so only the patentee could sell it, 
making the patentee’s name especially likely for public adoption. “Thermos,” from 
Thermos Corp., is easier to say than “Double walled vessel with a space for a vacuum 
between the walls.”157 A trademark that becomes generic, the very name for the product or 
service, is no longer a trademark.158 Rather, anyone can use the term to market their 
product. In the Internet world, some brands quickly go from nothing to world-famous. How 
hazardous is that for their legal status? 
¶38  Elliot v. Google addressed the question with today’s foremost example.159 People 
refer to "googling" for information, whether the search engine used is Google, Bing, Baidu, 
or something else.160 Has GOOGLE become generic, meaning it is no longer a valid mark? 
 
153 Id. at 218-19. 
154 Id. 
155 Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2014). 
156 Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
157 See Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 78 
(2014). (discussing how term “Thermos” became generic); Double walled vessel with a space for a vacuum 
between the walls, U.S. Patent No. 872,795 (filed Oct. 23, 1906). 
158 See, e.g., STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 390 
(4th ed. 2012). 
159 Elliot v. Google Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127352 (D. Ariz. 2014) (discussing whether “google” 
is generic). 
160 Id. at *23. 
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The court said no: "As one scholar has stated, ‘top-of-mind use of a trademark in its verb 
form, far from indicating the mark’s generic status, may well indicate the enduring fame 
of the brand.’"161 
D. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.162 
¶39  Trademark law also differs from patent and copyright in denying coverage on moral 
grounds. The Lanham Act denies registration to a mark that consists “of or comprises 
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest 
a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring 
them into contempt, or disrepute”163 Whether registration of the “Washington Redskins” 
mark should be cancelled as being disparaging of Native Americans has been the subject 
of long-running litigation.164 A proceeding begun in 1992 before the US Patent and 
Trademark Office led to a cancellation, which the courts overturned in 2009 on the grounds 
of laches, on the theory that the plaintiffs had waited too long after registration of the mark 
in 1967.165  
¶40  In Blackhorse, plaintiffs, too young to have filed any sooner, brought claims 
protesting the Washington Redskins name and logo.166 The TTAB held that the various 
trademark registrations used by the Washington Redskins “must be cancelled because they 
were disparaging to Native Americans at the respective times they were registered, in 
violation of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).”167  
Regardless of whether the courts affirm on appeal, the practical effects of the decision are 
limited. The decision simply cancels the federal registration of the mark, as opposed to 
ending ownership of the mark itself. The mark may still continue as an unregistered mark, 
but whether the team can  enforce unregistered mark would depend on yet more litigation. 
Social developments outside the legal system may bypass the courts. 
E. Specht v. Google, Inc.168 
¶41  Trademark rights (again in distinction to patent and copyright) depend on use. 
Continued rights require continued use.169 A dot-com company used the mark “Android 
Data” for e-commerce software but stopped operating in 2002. 170 Some brand owners that 
discontinue a product keep the trademark rights by continuing minimal use of the mark in 
commerce. But the dot.com did not take that course. 171 By ceasing use with intent not to 
 
161 Id. at *13 (quoting Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1313, 1348 (2010)). 
162 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B.2014). 
163 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
164 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
165 Id. 
166 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B.2014). Compare id., with 
In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.2014) (“Stop the Islamization of America” not a registrable mark, as 
it is disparaging to a substantial composite of American Muslims). 
167 Id. at 1082.  
168 Specht v. Google, Inc. 747 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2014). 
169 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
170 747 F.3d at 931. 
171 Id. 
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use the mark anymore, it abandoned the mark. 172 When Google later on made “Android” 
a famous signifier for a smartphone operating system, the former owner of Android could 
not prevent Google obtaining the rights in the mark.173 The case suggests that parties that 
discontinue products may be well advised to follow the practice of continuing using the 
marks if they might have commercial value.174   
F. Gutter Topper Ltd. v. Sigman & Sigman Gutters, Inc.175 
¶42  Relatively unsettled is whether liability for intellectual property infringement is 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.176 Bankruptcy discharge of debts will not apply to liability 
“for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another 
entity.”177 Gutter Topping shows there may be interplay between awards of attorney’s fees 
and whether the liability is dischargeable. The court applied Sixth Circuit precedent 
requiring that attorney’s fees may be awarded in trademark cases where “the infringement 
was malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate.”178 The defendant used the plaintiff’s 
mark after the licensing agreement had ended, for products clearly not within the scope of 
any permission granted, and even after the infringement suit had begun.179 The court held 
the conduct to be “willful and malicious” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s 
fees. 180The court also noted that “willful and malicious” was the standard for denying 
bankruptcy discharge, although the court was careful not to opine on the question of 
dischargeability, which would be addressed separately in the debtor’s bankruptcy 
proceeding.181 
 
172 Id. at 934. 
173 Id. at 935. See also Dragon Bleu v. VENM, LLC, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (T.T.A.B. 2014) 
(holding that, for purposes of USPTO proceedings, the three year period for abandoning registered mark 
begins only after registration). 
174 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark 99 YALE L.J. 759, 780 (discussing practice of 
“warehousing” trademarks) (1990). 
175 Gutter Topper Ltd. v. Sigman & Sigman Gutters, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162034 (S.D. Ohio 
Nov. 18, 2014). 
176 See, e.g., Caitlin McGowan, Copyright Infringement and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of Willful in 
Two Statutory Schemes, 20 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 51 (2009); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. 
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that a $675,000 statutory damages award for willful 
copyright infringement, by downloading 30 songs, did not violate due process.). See also Elf-Man, LLC v. 
C.G. Chinque Albright, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (suggesting large statutory damage 
awards for copyright infringement could be excessive punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment). 
177 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). See also In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
willfulness requirement means that discharge barred only if infringement is deliberate or intentional, not 
reckless) 
178 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162034, at *8 (quoting Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 728 
(6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1982))). 
179 Id. at 11-13. 
180 Id. at 15. 
181 Id. 
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G. Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc.182 
¶43  Speare Tools sold its adjustable hole saw in clear plastic packages.183 When 
competitors adopted similar packaging, Speare Tools claimed infringement of trade 
dress. 184 Functional matter is not protectable as a trademark. 185 Speare Tools argued that 
use of clear plastic packaging was not functional, because there were many other options 
open for competitors to package their tools. 186 The court took a broader view of 
functionality, relying on the Supreme Court’s statement in TrafFix that a design feature is 
functional if it is "essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or 
quality of the article."187 The court also declined to limit the broad view of functionality to 
product design, as opposed to product packaging.188 The snug, see-through plastic 
packaging was functional in several ways: 
(1) cheaper to produce (because of the use of minimal packaging); (2) 
stronger (because of the stepped sides on the blister package); (3) more 
appealing to consumers (by reducing cost, revealing the parts of the product 
at the point of sale, and including photos and instructions showing how the 
product is used); and (4) more appealing to retailers (because of the added 
strength, lower cost, nesting capability of the blister packages, and the use 
of information provided to consumers at the point of sale).189 
The case makes an interesting contrast to the Oracle v. Google holding on functionality in 
copyright law.190 
H. Sandybeachgifts.com v. Amazon.com, Inc.191 & Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd.192 
¶44  Sandybeachgifts and Skreened bookend the scope of liability for retail web site 
owners for their merchants’ sale of infringing products. In the former case, Amazon.com 
was not liable for infringement by associates in Amazon’s marketing program.193 The 
associates were independent businesses that allowed Amazon sales through their own 
sites.194 Amazon could terminate the sellers’ participation in the program, but did not share 
ownership or have operational control over the sellers.195 
 
182 Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162171 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2014). 
183 Id. at *5-6. 
184 Id. at *2-3. 
185 Id. at *7. 
186 Id. at *8. 
187 Id. at *9 (quoting TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Dsplays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)). 
188 Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162171, at *10-11  (E.D. Wis. Nov. 
18, 2014). 
189 Id. at *16. 
190 See infra p. 35. 
191 Sandybeachgifts.com v. Amazon.com, Inc., 584 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2014). 
192 Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 3d 905 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
193 584 F. App’x at 716. 
194 Id. at 714-15. 
195 Id. 




¶45  By contrast, in Skreened, a T-shirt printing site argued that it was not liable for selling 
shirts bearing counterfeit trademarks, because the designs had been uploaded by 
customers.196 Defendants argued that they should not be liable, because they at least 
attempted to avoid infringement, by instituting an “autohold” process when they received 
complaints from trademark owners.197 Despite the half-hearted attempted to avoid 
infringement, defendants printed numerous infringing shirts.198 The cost of avoiding 
infringement was no defense: “there is no exception in trademark law for infringers who 
take an ostrich approach to policing their business activities and complying with the 
law.”199   
I. Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management200 & La Quinta 
Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V.201 
¶46  The Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. lowered 
barriers to challenging the validity of intellectual property.202 The Court held that a party 
could bring a declaratory judgment action provided there was an actual controversy, 
 
196 16 F. Supp. 3d at 917. 
197 Id. at 916. 
198 Id. at 916-17. 
199 Id. at 917. 
200 Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 744 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2014). 
201 La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2014). 
202 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
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rejecting cases requiring a higher standard.203 Airs Aromatics rejected an attempt to further 
lower the standard in trademark cases.204 
¶47  The trademark statute allows courts to cancel a mark for invalidity.205 The Airs 
Aromatics court noted the trademark statute provides that “cancellation is available in ‘any 
action involving a registered mark.’"206 That language does not provide an independent 
cause of action to cancel a mark. 207 Rather, it provides a possible remedy in an action 
involving a mark, where the court already has jurisdiction, such as an infringement or 
declaratory judgment action. 208 Converting every statutory provision that gives powers to 
a court into a jurisdictional provision would greatly multiply the routes to federal 
jurisdiction. It would also negate the limits on jurisdiction. Moreover, a party seeking 
cancellation may already file a cancellation proceeding in the US Patent and Trademark 
office, an appropriate venue to begin consideration of whether that office should cancel a 
mark. 
¶48  By the same token, the same circuit ruled in La Quinta Worldwide that the statutory 
requirement that infringing use of a trademark be a “use in commerce” was not a 
jurisdictional requirement.209 The trademark statute provides that trademark infringement 
is a “use in commerce” of a symbol confusingly similar to a mark may infringe.210 But the 
relevant provisions provide a cause of action, rather than jurisdiction to hear the case.211 
Rather, the jurisdictional provision of the trademark statute provides broad jurisdiction 
over cases arising under the statute.212  
J.  Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC213 
¶49  Flying Pigs sought to enforce an equitable lien for failure to pay rent by foreclosing 
on federally registered trademarks.214 The Fourth Circuit held that a federal court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the case.215 Although a federally registered trademark was 
involved, the action was not brought under the federal trademark statute and raised no 
question of federal law. 216 There is considerable uncertainty about, at the outset of a 
financing transaction, whether federal or state law governs the requirements of notice when 
making a loan using intellectual property as collateral.217 If Flying Pigs is followed, there 
 
203 Id. at 137. 
204 744 F.3d 595. 
205 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012). 
206 Airs Aromatics, 744 F.3d at 599 (citing § 1119). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2014). 
210 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012). 
211 La Quinta, 762 F.3d at 873-74. 
212 See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012). The court relied on the distinction between elements of a claim and 
jurisdictional requirements, stressed in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
213 Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC, 757 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2014). 
214 Id. at 179. 
215 Id. at 182-83. 
216 Id. 
217 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Financing Innovation: Legal Development of Intellectual Property as 
Security in Financing, 48 IND. L. R. 509, 528-39 (2015). 
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will be less uncertainty at the end of a financing transaction, as  to which law governs when 
the creditor seeks to sell the collateral upon default by the debtor. 
K. Webceleb, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.218 
¶50  Webceleb reinforces a point that evidently needs to be repeated.219 A trademark 
owner does not own the word, rather only the right to prevent confusingly similar uses with 
respect to sales of goods or services.220 The defendants used “Favorite Web Celeb” as the 
category in an awards show and on a related web site. 221 Unbeknownst to them, 
WEBCELEB was a registered mark. 222 But those uses of a similar phrase would not 
confuse any potential consumer about the source of relevant goods or services. 223 A 
trademark, unlike a patent or copyright, does not bestow a broad set of exclusive rights in 
the relevant information.224 
III. COPYRIGHT 
A. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.225 
 
¶51  Even as Alice put the validity of many software patents in question, Oracle v. Google 
supports thicker copyright protection to software than leading cases.226 Copyright protects 
 
218 Webceleb, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 554 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2014). 
219 On over-enforcement of trademarks generally, see Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark 
Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011). 




224 Id. at 607-08 (“Any minimal confusion here is the "risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to 
identify its product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive phrase.") (quoting KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004)). 
225 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
226 Id. 
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only creative expression, not functional matter.227 Software qualifies for copyright 
protection, as a literary work,228 but the trend of authority had been to give thin protection. 
Oracle potentially reverses that trend, creating a split in approach between the circuit 
courts.229  
¶52  To enable Android, the operating system for smart phones, to run Java, Google 
copied many of Java’s API’s (application programming interfaces). 230 Android copied the 
names and headers for the Java modules. For example, Google would copy the header 
“java.lang.Math.max,” for a method that compares numbers.231 Google wrote its own code 
that does the comparison and returns a result.232  Java programmers could readily write 
apps for Android.233  This increased the number of software developers who could write 
Android apps, and would allow them to use some of the code they had written for other 
Java projects.234  
¶53  The issue was whether Google had copied protected creative expression, when it 
copied the names, organization of those names, and functionality of 37 out of 166 packages 
in the Java API. 235 The Federal Circuit reasoned that copyright protects Java’s “structure, 
sequence and organization.”236 Because the makers of Java could have used different 
names and organization for the API’s, the names that were chosen represented creative 
expression, not just functional elements.237 
¶54  The Federal Circuit rejected application of the approach taken by the First Circuit in 
Lotus v. Borland.238 Lotus had held that the menu command structure for a spreadsheet was 
a noncopyrightable “method of operation.”239 The menu command structure provided 
commands for spreadsheet users, such as Print, Copy, Subtract, and arranged them in a 
hierarchy.240 By copying that hierarchy, the defendant enabled the plaintiff’s former users 
to readily use defendants’ spreadsheet software241 – not unlike Java developers in Oracle. 
This holding, that the menu hierarchy was an uncopyrightable method of operation, was 
rejected in Oracle, in favor of using the more detailed abstraction-comparison-filtration 
analysis.242 
¶55  How wide the circuit split is remains to be determined. The Federal Circuit did not 
conclude that Google necessarily infringed the copyright in Java.243 Rather, it remanded 
 
227 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) ( “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
228 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
229 750 F.3d at 1358. 
230 Id. at 1350-51. 
231 Id. at 1349. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1350-51. 
234 Id. at 1349. 
235 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 1366-68. 
238 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
239 Id. at 815. 
240 Id. at 817. 
241 Id. at 818. 
242 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
243 Id. at 1377. 
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the case on the issues of whether Google’s copying was permitted in order to copy 
nonprotected functional expression and whether Google was protected by fair use.244  So 
the Federal Circuit and First Circuit reached slightly different conclusions that had large 
impact for litigation of software copyright cases.245  The First Circuit, by holding that 
interface specifications were not protected, as a method of operation, simplified the 
analysis.246  The Federal Circuit requires more steps in the litigation: First, determining 
whether there are separate creative elements in interfaces, and then seeing whether copying 
of any protected expression is permitted under various doctrines, such as copying to 
implement functionality or copying permitted under fair use.247  The application of those 
doctrines, in turn, will introduce a number of legal and factual issues not required under 
the First Circuit approach in Lotus. Fair use, for example, requires consideration of four 
factors, much more broad than considering simply the issue of functionality.248 
¶56  For now, Oracle casts a shadow on the practice of copying interfaces. The WINE 
project, for example, is a free software project that allows users to run Windows programs 
on Linux systems.249 WINE relies on using Windows applications programming 
interfaces.250 It could be susceptible to infringement claims if courts read software 
copyright broadly.  
B. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.251 
¶57  Digital technologies rely on copying, so courts interpreting words in the copyright 
statute can have broad implications on technology. The second paragraph of the definition 
of “public performance” (called the “transmit clause”) was added to the copyright statute 
to cover rebroadcasting by cable companies.252 In early days, cable companies would 
capture broadcast television shows on antennas and rebroadcast the shows over their cable 
network.253  The Supreme Court had held that this was not a public performance, and so 
the cable company did not need permission from the television show copyright holder.254 
Those copyright holders promptly convinced Congress to include such rebroadcasting in 
their exclusive rights, adding the “transmit clause” to the copyright holder’s public 




246 Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815. 
247 750 F.3d at 1377. 
248 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating four factors for fair use analysis). 
249 See WINEHQ, https://www.winehq.org/. 
250 “Wine translates Windows API calls into POSIX calls on-the-fly, eliminating the performance and 
memory penalties of other methods and allowing you to cleanly integrate Windows applications into your 
desktop.” About Wine, WINEHQ, https://www.winehq.org/about/. 
251 Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
252 Id. at 2505-06. 
253 Id. at 2504. 
254 Id. at 2504-05, discussing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) 
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
255 Id. at 2506 (“Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which specifies that an entity performs 
publicly when it ‘transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . to the public.’ §101; see ibid. (defining ‘[t]o “transmit” 
a performance’ as ‘to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received 
beyond the place from which they are sent’).”). 
256 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
Vol. 13:3] Stephen McJohn 
 343 
Second Circuit had held that there was no public performance where customers of 
Cablevision used remote storage provided by Cablevision to record programs and watch 
them at their leisure.257 The court noted the broad scope of the transmission clause, 
applying where members of the public receive the transmission “in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.”258 But the clause applies only 
to members of the public “capable of receiving the performance.”259  Because the 
performance is the single copy transmitted, the court reasoned, only the single customer 
was capable of receiving it, meaning that it was not a public performance.260 Rather, many 
Cablevision customers could make private performances of the same program from their 
individual remote storage devices provided by Cablevision.261 
¶58  Aereo created a convoluted rebroadcasting system designed to piggyback on the 
Cablevision decision.262 Aereo’s system had thousands of tiny antennas, each coupled with 
a small storage device.263 An Aereo customer could control their antenna and storage to 
record programs or rebroadcast them to the customer.264 The Second Circuit again held 
that meant that each customer had a private performance, even if thousands of customers 
were watching the same broadcast show.265 The Supreme Court reversed, looking both to 
the broader language (“in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times”) and to the purpose of the statute.266 In the Court’s view, Aereo was doing 
the same sort of rebroadcasting that the definition was designed to target:  
Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, 
many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast. In 
providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, housed in a 
centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes. By means of its 
technology (antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] 
programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by private 
channels to additional viewers.”267  
¶59  The question after Aereo is how broadly it applies. The Court took care not to cast a 
cloud on technological development, stating that it was not ruling on issues of cloud 
computing, remote storage DVRs, and other novel issues to arise in other cases.268 
 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 134. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 135-36. 
261 Id. 
262 Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503-04. 
263 Id. at 2503. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 2503-04. 
266  Id. at 2509 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
267 Id. at 2506 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)). 
268 Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511. 
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C. Petrella v. MGM269 
¶60  Petrella provides copyright owners some latitude in enforcement. Copyright has a 
three-year statute of limitations.270 If a defendant continues to infringe, however, each new 
infringement is separate, starting a new three-year period for filing suit based on the new 
infringements.271 Where the 1980 film Raging Bull allegedly infringed a 1963 screenplay, 
the copyright holder brought an action in 2009 seeking to recover for infringements (such 
as public performances) that occurred in 2006 and thereafter.272 MGM sought the 
application of the equitable doctrine of laches, under which a defendant that unreasonably 
delays in enforcement may lose its right to damages.273 The Supreme Court held that where 
Congress has set a statutory time limit, there is no place for equity to add an additional time 
limit.274  The Court noted (among other reasons), that a contrary rule might create more 
copyright litigation, because copyright owners would fear losing their rights if they did not 
sue even for trivial infringement.275 
D. Garcia v. Google, Inc.276 
 
¶61  Cindy Lee Garcia played a minor role in a film with the working title “Desert 
Warrior.”277 After the project was abandoned, the pragmatic producer used the footage of 
her scenes in an anti-Islamic film titled “Innocence of Muslims,” dubbing lines over her 
performance. 278   
 
269 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
270 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
271 134 S. Ct. at 1969-70. 
272 Id. at 1970-71. 
273 Id. at 1975-76. 
274 Id. at 1974. 
275 Id. 
276 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
277 Id. at 932. 
278 Id. 
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¶62  The Ninth Circuit held that, although the director held the copyright in the film, 
Garcia might have a copyrightable interest in her performance.279  Copyright applies to an 
original work of authorship, fixed in a tangible medium.280 The court made a convincing 
argument that Garcia made an original contribution, which requires some creativity:  “But 
an actor does far more than speak words on a page; he must ‘live his part inwardly, and 
then . . . give to his experience an external embodiment.’”281 That embodiment includes 
body language, facial expression, and reactions to other actors and elements of a scene. Id. 
at 218-219. Otherwise, “‘every shmuck . . . is an actor because everyone . . . knows how to 
read.’”282   
¶63  But the court did not explain how a performance would qualify as a work of 
authorship.  This view seems to make a film an amalgamation of many works of authorship, 
as would be any other work with contributions from more than one person. That doctrinal 
innovation would have considerable practical consequences, making a potential author out 
of anyone with any input into a work, greatly increasing the need for negotiation and 
transaction costs.283  Before the end of the year, the Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the 
case en banc.284 Perhaps the case will live on mainly in copyright law courses. 
E. Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG285 
¶64  Oracle provides guidance on awards of reasonable royalties in copyright cases. The 
court overturned a jury award of some $1.3 billion, because Oracle’s evidence as to the 
value of damages flowing from copyright infringement by unauthorized use of software 
was speculative, with no showing of how much income SAP gained from the 
infringement.286 But the court showed several ways in which a plaintiff could show a 
reasonable royalty, which would be what the parties likely would have agreed on had they 
negotiated a license.287 First, the court rejected the theory that there could be no 
hypothetical license because Oracle never licensed its software.288  The very point of 
figuring out a hypothetical license fee is that there was no actual transaction.289  Second, 
evidence of revenue from infringement should be more than simply projections of hoped-
for income, which were not linked directly to the infringing activity. 290  Likewise, the cost 
 
279 Id. at 935. 
280 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
281 766 F.3d at 934, quoting Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares 15, 219 (Elizabeth Reynolds 
Hapgood trans., 1936). 
282 766 F.3d at 945, quoting Sanford Meisner & Dennis Longwell, Sanford Meisner on Acting 178 
(1987). 
283 See e.g., Venkat Balasubramani, In Its “Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit is Guilty 
of Judicial Activism-Garcia v. Google. Technology & Marketing Law Blog (Feb. 27, 2014),  
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-innocence-of-muslims-ruling-the-ninth-circuit-is-
guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm. See also Rebecca Tushnet, March 17, 2014, My long, sad 
Garcia v. Google post, Rebecca Tushnet's 43(B)log (March 17, 2014), 
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/03/my-long-sad-garcia-v-google-post.html. 
284 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
285 Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2014). 
286 Id. at 1091. 
287 Id. at 1087-88. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 1090. 
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to plaintiff of granting a license could be shown more directly than simply how much it 
cost to acquire the entities that made the software, because the software could be licensed 
to multiple licensees. 291 Lastly, actual licenses granted with respect to the subject matter 
would provide objective evidence to support the terms of a hypothetical license. 292 
F. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust293 
¶65  Does fair use protect the Google Book project? Google is attempting to scan the 
world’s books, presently working with a number of libraries and Google’s innovative 
scanning technology.294  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust held that fair use protected 
unauthorized scanning and compiling of books into a searchable database. 295  The case 
involved only a limited set of purposes, so it is only preliminary to applying fair use to 
Google Books as a whole. 296  Google scanned books from the collection of member 
libraries, such as universities. 297 Any web user could search the database and receive 
results showing only books containing the search terms, along with page numbers (no 
snippets of text, unlike Google Books). 298 Member libraries could use the database to 
enable readers with disabilities (such as blindness or inability to turn pages) to use adaptive 
technologies, such as software that magnified the text or read it aloud.299 Member libraries 
could also use electronic copies to replace lost originals. 300  Fair use protected these limited 
uses. The case leaves open broader questions, such as searches that return portions of texts 
and provide information used for commercial purposes, not to mention advertising revenue. 
G. Cambridge University Press v. Patton301 
¶66  Fair use is a bulwark of copyright law, but somewhat unpredictable, perhaps because 
the relevant rule is a four factor test with little guidance as to how to weigh the factors.302 
The trial court in Cambridge University Press had introduced a little bright line 
guidance.303 For university copying for coursebooks, it had held that copying 10 percent 
of a work or just one chapter was presumptively fair use.304 The appellate court reversed 
 
291 Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2014). 
292 Id. at 1092. 
293 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). See also Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. 
v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.  2014) (finding that the distribution of a recording of a company’s 
conference call with analysts disclosing earning was fair use). 
294 See 755 F.3d at 90. 
295 See id. at 105. 
296 See id. at 91-92. 
297 See id.at 90. 
298 See id.at 91. 
299 See id. 
300 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
301 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair 
Use Cases of 2014, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guest-blog-post.htm. 
302 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 
1284 (2008) (characterizing fair use as unpredictable and uncertain). 
303 769 F.3d at 1271-72. 
304 Id. 
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that approach, holding that a case-by-case approach must be taken.305 In particular, the 
court also placed more weight on the market impact of the possible loss of licensing 
revenue, which could be realized through such means as the Copyright Clearance 
Center.306 
H. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd.307 
¶67  Some Sherlock Holmes stories, published before 1922, are out of copyright, but later 
stories are still under copyright.308 Klinger began a project to write a sequel featuring 
Sherlock Holmes.309  After author Conan Doyle’s estate threatened to sue for infringement, 
Klinger filed a declaratory judgment action.310   The estate argued that using Sherlock 
Holmes would copy creative expression from the later stories, because the complex 
character Sherlock Holmes changed over time. 311   The Seventh Circuit held that second 
author could freely copy the character Sherlock Holmes from the public domain.312   Only 
if the estate could show specific copying of expression would there be infringement.313   
The court rejected the argument that the later Sherlock Holmes could not be distinguished 
from earlier Sherlock Holmes.314    If there was no difference, then there would be no 
additional original expression to merit additional copyright protection.  
 
305 Id. at 1275. 
306 Id. at 1281. 
307 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014). 
308 Id. at 497. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 498. 
311 Id. at 501-02. 
312 Id. 
313 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2014). 
314 Id. at 501-02. 
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I. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.315 
 
¶68  Sixties musicians, Flo & Eddie of The Turtles, truly keep on truckin’. The 1976 
federal Copyright Act held that the public performance right in pre 1972 sound recordings 
(as opposed to the copyright in musical works) was not governed by federal law.316 
Decades later, two federal trial courts have held that pre 1972 sound recordings are 
recognized by state law copyright.317 If the decisions in the key jurisdictions of California 
and New York survive appeal, then broadcasters may have to pay for rights to play songs 
that they have long played for free (not to mention damages for recent use).318 Arranging 
such transactions may be cumbersome, because existing licensing statutory schemes apply 
only to works under federal copyright. Such recordings may also trigger liability for online 
services such as YouTube, because the immunity of online service providers under the 
DMCA arguably extends only to federal copyright.319  Flower power may disturb the 
establishment once again.  
J. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc.320 
¶69  Inhale addressed the same general issue as Oracle vs. Google, the distinction 
between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable functional matter.321  The product 
at issue was the design of a water pipe system for smoking.322  Broad copyright protection 
in product design would effectively give patent protection for an unpatented product.  The 
shape of the hookah water container was not subject to copyright protection.323  Although 
the shape was distinctive and artistic, it did not have aesthetic elements that were separable 
 
315 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139053 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
2014).  
316 See Lee Gesmer, The Kerfuffle Over Copyrights in Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, MASS IP BLOG 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://masslawblog.com/copyright/the-kerfuffle-over-copyrights-in-pre-1972-sound-
recordings/ (discussing practical impact of Flo and Eddie and possible judicial and legislative 
developments). 
317 Decisions are both captioned Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Flo & Eddie I), 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 139053 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) and Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Flo & 
Eddie II), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). 
318 Flo & Eddie II; Flo & Eddie I. 
319 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(recognizing the issue unsettled and holding that immunity may apply to state law claims). 
320Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 739 F.3d 446 (9th Cir.) opinion amended and superseded on 
denial of reh'g, 755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (July 9, 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 758 
(2014). 
321 Id. at 448-49. 
322 Id. at 447. 
323 Id. at 448-49. 
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from its function.324  If the shape of the water container were changed, it would work 
differently.325  
¶70  Inhale and Oracle involve quite different subject matter, software and a hookah water 
container—yet they consider the same issue—functionality. Under Oracle’s reasoning, 
perhaps Inhale would be decided differently, because there are many different shapes of 
water containers that would serve the same general function.326  Likewise, Inhale’s 
approach could yield a different result in Oracle: changing the API’s would make the 
software function in a different way.327  The difficult question is whether the cases are 
legally inconsistent or simply governed by the difference in subject matter. 
K. AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe328 
¶71  Various enterprises seek to find a way to recover from alleged small-scale copyright 
infringements. AF Holdings rejected an attempt to bring infringement actions en masse.329 
The plaintiffs bought the copyright to a film and sued 1,058 anonymous defendants, 
identified only by IP address, alleging that each had downloaded the film using 




326 Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 739 F.3d 446, 448-49 (9th Cir.) (applying test based on 
existing shape, not alternatives). 
327 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying test based on 
availability of alternatives). 
328 AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058, 752 F.3d 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
329 Id. at 992. 
330 Id. 
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out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”331  But, 
getting the film from different BitTorrent swarms on dates months apart was not the same 
series of transactions, any more than “two individuals who play at the same blackjack table 
at different times.”332 
L. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC333   
 
¶72  The Seventh Circuit held that it was fair use to use a photograph of a mayor, 
downloaded from the city’s website, to make a T-Shirt mocking the mayor.334 The key was 
that little of the creative expression of the original was used: 
Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat, 
only the smile remains. Defendants started with a low-resolution version 
posted on the City's website, so much of the original's detail never had a 
chance to reach the copy; the original's background is gone; its colors and 
shading are gone; the expression in Soglin's eyes can no longer be read; 
after the posterization (and reproduction by silk-screening), the effect of the 
lighting in the original is almost extinguished. What is left, besides a hint of 
Soglin's smile, is the outline of his face, which can't be copyrighted. 
Defendants could have achieved the same effect by starting with a snap-
shot taken on the street.335 
 
¶73  The court’s pragmatic approach varies from fair use case law in two significant ways. 
First, to make the T-Shirt, the defendants had to make copies along the way in the process 
 
331 FED R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
332 752 F.3d at 998. 
333 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
334 Id. at 759. 
335 Id. 
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of making the design.336 In other cases, such as reverse-engineering or data-base extraction,  
courts have considered whether such intermediate copies were infringing or were fair 
use337 (although the Seventh Circuit noted that a low-resolution copy was used).338  
Second, the court did not look to whether the use was “transformative,” a question that 
other courts give great weight in fair use.339  The court stated that it was “skeptical” of that 
approach, because it gives little weight to the list of factors in Section 107 and because 
equating “transformative” with fair use threatens to do away with the copyright owner’s 
exclusive right to make derivative works.340  
IV. TRADE SECRET 
A. Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer341 
¶74  Contract law may provide an alternative or supplement to trade-secret protection. 
Showing breach of a nondisclosure or non-compete agreement does not require as high a 
showing as misappropriating a trade secret.342 Breach of contract does not require the same 
elements as misappropriation and the information at issue need not be proved to be a trade 
secret.343  The contract at issue in Loftness defined protected information much more 
broadly than a trade secret (“[s]uch information that [T & A] considers to be proprietary 
and/or confidential”) and the acts that constituted breach likewise more broadly than the 
wrongful actions that would constitute misappropriation (promising not to use T&A’s 
 
336 Id. at 757. 
337 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying fair use to 
intermediate copying for reverse engineering). 
338 766 F.3d at 759. 
339 Id. at 758. 
340 Id. 
341 Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2014). By contrast, 
where a party freely allows information to circulate without restrictions, a nondisclosure agreement with 
one party will not make the information a trade secret. See nClosures Inc. v. Block & Co., 770 F.3d 598 
(7th Cir.  2014). 
342 742 F.3d at 850-51. 
343 Id. 
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"confidential information in any way that could be construed as being competitive of [T & 
A’s] business").344  The appellate court held it was error to grant summary judgment on the 
grounds that the defendant had not misappropriated a trade secret.345  Rather, the court 
remanded for the question of whether the defendant had breached its broader obligations 
under the contract.346 
B. United States v. Auernheimer347 
 
¶75  Auernheimer promised to be key precedent for trade secret practice, but the court 
decided the case on other grounds.348 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")349 
prohibits unauthorized access to computers. Courts have differed on how to construe 
unauthorized access.350 Suppose an employee uses her work computer to load up on 
valuable trade secrets from her employer’s stock, then takes the information to a competitor 
or her own start-up. Some courts would hold this would not be not unauthorized access, 
because her employer gave her access to the files.351 Other courts may hold it unauthorized, 
because she exceeded the scope of authorization given – her employer did not give her 
permission to take the trade secrets for her own purposes.352 
¶76  Auernheimer is not an employee case, but was widely watched on the issue of 
unauthorized use. Auernheimer exploited a security flaw to visit public AT&T web sites 
(by making it look as if he were using an iPad) and get email addresses of iPad users from 
 
344 Id. at 848. 
345 Id. at 851. 
346 Id. 
347 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014). 
348 Id. at 541 (reversing for lack of venue, not reaching issue of the extent to which CFAA protects 
trade secrets). 
349 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) et seq. (2012). 
350 See 748 F.3d at 541. 
351 See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
352 See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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AT&T.353 Unauthorized access? Auernheimer argued not, because he was visiting sites 
that were open to the public.354 The prosecution, successful in the trial court, argued that it 
was because Auernheimer’s software was configured, in a broad and anthropomorphic 
sense, to deceive AT&T’s web server, negating any authorization.355 On appeal, the Third 
Circuit did not reach this juicy issue, holding instead that the prosecution had been brought 
in the wrong district.356   Auernheimer acted in Fayetteville, Arkansas, accessing servers 
in Dallas, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia.357  The case was brought in New Jersey, which had 
no apparent connection to the case.358  The conviction was vacated, leaving the uncertainty 
around the CFAA unchanged. 359  
C. Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm360 
¶77  A contractual promise in an employment agreement not to compete may serve as a 
proxy for trade-secret protection. Trade secret misappropriation by an employee may be 
very difficult to show.361  A promise not to work for competitors may reduce the chance 
that a former employee may use trade secrets – although such clauses must be limited to 
their reasonable scope, both to protect the employee’s ability to work in the market and to 
foster the general policy of freedom of flow of experts and expertise. 362   
¶78  Covenants not to compete are enforceable only if reasonable, because of the 
limitation on the employee.363   But that does not make them any more difficult (in 
jurisdictions that enforce them) to agree to than other clauses. A restrictive covenant in a 
click-wrap employment agreement was enforceable, even where changes in employment 
terms were not made conspicuous. 364   Rather, the terms fell within the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, despite the fact the employee did not read the agreement before 
agreeing.365 Even the most formalistic contract doctrines with respect to written contracts 
did not require proof that a party had read all provisions of a contract before being bound.366 
That approach is more efficient than a regime that would require parties to spend time and 
resources reading (and documenting that reading) for every provision in a contract. 
 
353 748 F.3d at 529-31. 
354 See id. at 534. 
355 See id. at 531-32. 
356 Id. at 541. 
357 Id.at 533-36. 
358 Id. at 536. 
359 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 541 (3d Cir. 2014). 
360 Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014). 
361 See, e.g., id. at *40 (upholding injunction for potential breach of contract, without showing of actual 
misappropriation of trade secrets). 
362 Id. at *20. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at *20-22. 
365 Id. 
366 See, e.g., Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115, 126 (Md. 1952) (“One who makes a written offer which is 
accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to 
be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of 
its proper interpretation.”) (quoting Restatement -- Contracts, Section 70). 
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D. Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, L.L.C.367 
¶79  In trade secret law, even post eBay, a showing of misappropriation may almost 
automatically lead to an injunction: when “a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a 
position to use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed.”368 The same overall 
framework for granting an injunction governs, but the requirement of irreparable harm is 
more easily met.369 Trade secret poses different risks than patent, copyright, and trademark. 
Not only is it misappropriation to use trade secret information wrongfully, it is 
misappropriation to simply wrongfully acquire the information. 370  If the information 
becomes public, it will no longer be a trade secret.371 Courts readily grant injunctions to 
protect trade secrets, where wrongful behavior is involved. 372  In Core Labs, former 
employees of the plaintiff took a secret software application and associated customer 
information to a start-up competitor, saving the cost of developing such information 
themselves and providing a market advantage.373  
E. Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc.374 & ABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc.375 
¶80  Trade secret and patent law interact in many ways. An inventor may choose between 
keeping in invention secret and publishing it to get a patent. A patentee may use patent law 
to protect an invention, but also use trade secret processes in connection with practicing 
the invention, to have two lines of defenses against copiers.  
¶81  Wang v. Palo Alto Networks involved a less common intersection. Wang alleged that 
his business partner had wrongfully disclosed trade secret firewall technology to Palo Alto 
Networks.376 Wang did not sue until after several years after the alleged disclosure, but 
alleged that the statute of limitations had not run because he learned of the disclosure only 
by reading newspaper accounts of Palo Alto’s initial public offering. 377   But the 
information had been contained in published patent applications of Palo Alto, at a time 
when Wang was seeking his own patents. 378  The court held that a trade secret owner was 
on constructive notice of other patent applications in the area of technology. 379  Wang had 
the requisite notice to run afoul of the statute of limitations, which started running at that 
time.380 
 
367 Core Labs. v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., LLC, 532 Fed. App’x 904 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Where defendant 
used plaintiff’s trade secret fracking software, there was irreparable harm and an injunction would apply). 
368 Id. at 909 (quoting IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App. 
2005)). 
369 Id. at 910-11.  
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 911 (holding injunction appropriate to protect confidential information and trade secrets). 
372 Id. (“Spectrum's possession of Core's trade secret information is presumptively improper and its 
adverse use during the potentially prolonged PTO reexamination and appeal periods is not likely to be fully 
remediable by monetary damages.”). 
373 Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, LLC, 532 Fed. App’x 904, 909-11 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
374 Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014). 
375 ABB Turbo Sys. AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
376 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 at *13-14. 
377 Id. at *24-25. 
378 Id. at *23. 
379 Id. at *20. 
380 Id. at *20-21. 
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¶82  In ABB Turbo, the alleged trade secret misappropriation likewise was long before the 
action was filed.381 ABB Turbo alleged that a former employee handed over envelopes of 
cash to ABB employees for confidential business information for decades. 382  The 
information related to patents (which were also allegedly infringed). 383  Unlike Wang, 
there was no public information available to the trade secret owner disclosing the 
information. 384  The statute of limitations did not begin to run until ABB Turbo learned of 
the information sales. 385 
F. Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc.386 
¶83  The defendant in Altavion argued that there was a choice between trade secret and 
patent protection, at least for product design: “[g]eneralized ideas and inventions are 
protectable by patents and thus cannot be trade secrets.”387 There is a boundary between 
copyright and patent: functional matter may be patentable, but is not subject to copyright. 
But trade secret and patent overlap in covering functional matter, such as product design. 
Rather, as the court emphasized, it is disclosure that separates trade secret from patent 
subject matter. 388 Until disclosure, both may potentially cover valuable information: if “a 
patentable idea is kept secret, the idea itself can constitute information protectable by trade 
secret law.”389 
¶84  Nor had the plaintiff lost trade secret protection by disclosing its general idea for 
digital stamping technology to potential partners. 390  It made it general idea public, but did 
not disclose its specific design implementation for the technology, which remained a trade 
secret. 391  Keeping trade secret protection does not require absolute secrecy, even about 
the existence of the technology itself. 392  Likewise, that design implementation would be 
disclosed when the product was sold to the public. But until that time, the implementation 
technology would be valuable because it had not been disclosed to others, and would 
remain a trade secret. 393 
G. Bianco v. Globus Medical, Inc.394 
¶85  An idea for a product can be a trade secret. Misappropriation will lie, even if the 
defendant uses the idea for a different product than envisioned.395  A trade secret may have 
broader value than simply instructing how to make a particular product, and may have 
 
381 ABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
382 Id. at 982-83. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. at 985-86. 
386 Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26 (171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714). 
387 Id. at 53 (quoting defendants’ brief). 
388 Id. at 55-56. 
389 Id. at 55. 
390 Id. at 58-59. 
391 Id. 
392 Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc, 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 57 (171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714). 
393 Id. at 60-61. 
394 Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151967 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2014). 
395 Id. at *39-44. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 5  
 
 356 
value in formulating other products as well. 396 The fact that the defendant may have 
supplied additional value, such as research or market analysis, will not absolve the 
defendant of liability for wrongfully using the protected information.397 
H. Mandel v. Thrasher (In re Mandel)398 
¶86  Intellectual property encourages innovation. Intellectual property litigation can 
likewise result in innovation. Mandel v. Thrassher rejected the creative theory that, where 
an executive stole trade secrets, he authorized their disclosure on the part of the 
company.399 If the disclosure was authorized, then there would be no liability for wrongful 
disclosure. Such a rule would swallow much of trade secret law with respect to employees, 
not to mention insulate fiduciaries from responsibility for breach of their duties.400 
¶87  The case also makes a holding similar to Oracle v. SAP, that an award of damages 
requires evidentiary support.401 The bankruptcy court held that the plaintiffs’ expert 
testimony did not establish an amount of damages recoverable under either a "lost asset" 
or "lost profit" theory. 402  The court nevertheless awarded the nice round amounts in 
damages of $1,000,000 and $400,000 to the respective plaintiffs, without any 
explanation. 403 The appellate court remanded the case for the lower court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or explain the basis of its award. 404 
I. Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee;405 In re Valero Ref.-Tex.;406 Powder River Basin 
Reservation Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Commission;407 & In re 
Microbilt Corp.408 
¶88  A party would not be permitted to do forensic imaging of a laptop in discovery, where 
the laptop contained trade secrets not related to the litigation and less intrusive means had 
been rejected during discovery discussions.409 Valero held that financial records which 
could qualify as trade secrets might not be discoverable in tax collection litigation, without 
a showing of particularized need.410 Powder River Basin held that fracking methods 





398 Mandel v. Thrasher (In re Mandel), 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709 (5th Cir. 2014). 
399 Id. at *16-17.  
400 Id.  
401 Id. at *31-34.  
402 Id.  
403 Id.  
404 In re Mandel, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709 *31-34. 
405 Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107584 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014). 
406 In re Valero Ref.-Tex., No. 01-14-00149-CV (Tex. App., August 21, 2014). 
407 Powder River Basin Reservation Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014 WY 37 
(Wyo. 2014); Cynthia J. Rigsby, Trade Secret vs. Patent Protection: Consider FOIA or Public Records 
Requests, www.iplitigationcurrent.com (Mar. 13, 2014). 
408 In re Microbilt Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23212 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2014) 
409 Boston Scientific Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107584 at *17-22. 
410 No. 01-14-00149-CV (Tex. App., Aug. 21, 2014). 
411 2014 WY 37 (Wyo. 2014); see Rigsby, supra note 407. 
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¶89  On the flip side, sometimes a trade secret owner cannot get remedies from a confidant 
that discloses the trade secret, a nondisclosure agreement notwithstanding.  For example, 
in In re Microbilt, Chex, a data provider, sued several of its resellers.412 In court filings, 
Chex included trade secrets, such as a customer list, provided to it by Microbilt under a 
confidentiality agreement.413 Microbilt’s action for trade secret misappropriation, by 
wrongful disclosure, foundered on the absolute litigation privilege, which protects 
disclosures to courts.414 
J. Hallmark Cards v. Monitor Clipper Partners415 
¶90  Hallmark Cards provided confidential market research, in Powerpoint format, to 
consultant Monitor Company Group under a nondisclosure agreement.416 Monitor 
Company group nonetheless sent the information on to its affiliate Monitor Clipper 
Partners, a private equity firm, which used it to acquire and manage a competitor of 
Hallmark Cards.417  Monitor Clipper Partners argued that the information was not a trade 
secret, because Hallmark had made public general conclusions based on the research.418   
But as the court concluded, the data was valuable as basis for analysis: other parties might 
have reached other conclusions from the data. Total secrecy is not a prerequisite for trade 
secret protection.419 
K. Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc.420 
¶91   Bluestem upholds the use of a clean room development in financial engineering, not 
unlike a clean room in software reverse engineering.421 As a step toward a possible merger, 
two retailers shared information under a non-disclosure agreement. 422  The merger fell 
through.423 Bluestem Brands subsequently unveiled a payroll deduction plan to help buyers 
finance big purchases. 424  Purchasing Power alleged the process was taken from 
information provided in confidence. 425  Bluestem produced evidence that the process was 
developed independently by a team kept separate from those involved in the potential 
merger. 426  Purchasing Power had no direct evidence that its information was used, only 
such “circumstantial” evidence as general similarities between the programs. 427  The courts 
found no misappropriation. 428   In the big picture, the case is helpful for trade secret 
 
412 In re Microbilt Corp., No. 11-18143, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4566 at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013). 
413 Microbilt Corp. v. Chex Sys., 588 F. App’x 179, 180-81 (10th Cir. 2014). 
414 Id. at 180. 
415 Hallmark Cards v. Monitor Clipper Partners, 758 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014). 
416 Id. at 1054-55. 
417 Id. 
418 Id. at 1056-57. 
419 Id. 
420 Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
421 Id. at 1317-18. 
422 Id. at 1308-09. 
423 Id. at 1309 
424 Id. at 1309-10. 
425 Id. at 1310. 
426 Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1317-18 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
427 Id. at 1316-17. 
428 Id. at 1317-18. 
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owners. If independent development were not a defense in such settings, then parties might 
be more reluctant to enter into nondisclosure agreements, because they would lose the 
ability to develop information themselves that the other party already had. 
